Prosecution and Offense Issues Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Prosecution and Offense Issues - Essay Example The prosecutor must go beyond at this point since most police often stop at the point of probable cause. In other words, the prosecutor must be diligent enough to find other corroborating witnesses and employ the help of forensic experts in gathering more crime scene evidence to make the case airtight towards a final conviction. Discussion Other necessary legal prosecution preparations include discussing the merits of the case with the witness/es and also try going over the case of the defense so that all involved in the case has a good overview of what might happen and how to counter the arguments of the defense side and then present counter-arguments; witnesses should be adequately prepared by their offense lawyer on possible questions to be asked by the defense lawyer during their cross-examination. All these required work is collectively termed as witness preparation (Ahmed, 2009, p. 25). The good prosecution lawyers are prepared for anything and do not allow themselves to be cau ght in off-guard situations, such as the presentation of a surprise witness or evidence by the defense. An example would be prosecuting a case for homicide. The prosecuting attorney must be certain about a few things, such as the identification of the suspect, the motive, the opportunity to commit the crime and all the additional evidence that will establish the presence of the suspect at the time and location of the crime scene when the crime was committed.

Philosophy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words - 1

Philosophy - Essay Example However, such a theory needs some qualifications. For example, what is the process by which we decide which ideas are ‘causally related’? In other words, what are the cognitive components of the mind which Hume argues, go into related some ideas, but not others? The following will examine the relationship between inference and epistemology, demonstrate Hume'’ scepticism, and analyze Kant as a means of criticizing and overcoming Hume’s problem. Toward this, Hume argues that when we examine two distinct ideas, or in turn, two impressions which we might think are related, we supposedly find that we do not perceive any of the necessary, or ‘causal’ connections between these two ideas or impressions. Rather, Hume argues that what we do perceive, are only those ideas which are contiguous and successive. Hume writes: Without any farther ceremony, we call the one ‘cause’ and the other ‘effect’, and infer the existence of the o ne from that of the other. In all those instances, from which we learn the conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the causes have been perceiv’d by the senses, and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning them, there is only perceiv’d or remember’d, and the other is supply’d by conformity to our past experience . . .This relation is their constant conjunction. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv’d in several instances [Hume 87] Although a long passage, the preceding contains many of the core ideas surrounding Hume’s ‘model of the mind’, his notion of ‘causation’, and finally, the notion of ‘inference’ – that is, the opposite of a deductive or necessary form of reasoning. First, is the important notion of sense impression. Hume argu es that the mind operates by ‘mirroring nature’ – to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty [1979]. An impression of the external world, is akin to a photographic image, and to this end, he argues also that the more immediate an impression is, the more â€Å"lively† [Hume, 1995: 98]. In other words, past impressions are more vague. The second important aspect of his theory of causality, is the notion of ‘belief’ or ‘understanding’. In this regard, he argues that the relationship between one impression and another impression (e.g. representation), is a relationship that is founded on ‘belief’, and belief itself is formed out of custom and habit. He argues that habit and not the impressions themselves are what ‘conjoin’ the two, given that any careful consideration of the nominal nature of impressions, will yield the conclusion that two certain ‘frames’ are different than another. By contrast, he c laims that notions such as â€Å"identity†, â€Å"time†, â€Å"place† and finally â€Å"cause†, are only â€Å"ideas† rather than anything which actually exists in nature and therefore understood or perceptible by the senses [Hume 73]. The classic example of two such impressions, are between ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’. Taken or understood as images, separately, that is, neither one of these resemble one-another. There is no reason, save for habit and experience, to relate one of these impressions with the next. Indeed, he argues